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KAESTNER FAILS: THE WAY FORWARD
MITCHELL M. GANS*
ABSTRACT
This past term, the Supreme Court applied the Due Process
Clause to prevent the states from closing down a tax strategy that
employs out-of-state trusts. Many had hoped that the case would
serve as a vehicle for the Court to overrule taxpayer-friendly precedents that make the strategy possible. But it failed. The question
that emerges is whether the decision leaves the states with a path
to address the strategy and thereby prevent it from being used to
exacerbate issues of inequality. After examining the decision, this
Article considers the options available to the states and then suggests a way forward.


* Mitchell M. Gans is a professor at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra University, where he is the Rivkin Radler Distinguished Professor in
Taxation. He is also an adjunct professor at NYU School of Law. He is the
Academic Editor of the ACTEC Journal. He participated in drafting the
ACTEC amicus brief in Kaestner. Brief for American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v.
Kimberly Rice Kaestner Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (No. 18-457), 2019
WL 1057910. He also served on the New York State Bar Association Committee
that formulated legislation enacted in New York to address the out-of-state
trust strategy. He wishes to acknowledge the efforts of Professor Ashleigh
Gough, whose assistance was invaluable.
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INTRODUCTION
In North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice
Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,1 decided this past term, the Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause2 precluded North Carolina
from taxing the income of an out-of-state trust even though a
beneficiary resided in the state. Two facts were critical to the
Court’s holding: the trust was under administration in another
state, where the trustee was located, and no distribution of trust
income had been made to the beneficiary.3 North Carolina, in short,
lacked sufficient contacts with the trust to justify its tax.4
In recent years, a planning strategy designed to reduce state
income tax, similar to the one employed by the Kaestner family,
has proliferated—surprisingly abetted by the Internal Revenue
Service.5 The strategy exploits the due process limitations the
states encounter when they seek to tax transactions or activity
occurring beyond their borders. When the Court granted certiorari in Kaestner, many had hoped that the Court would take the
opportunity to sweep away the limitations, or at least minimize
them, in order to diminish the strategy’s effectiveness—similar
to a step it had taken the previous term in an analogous context.6
These hopes were unfortunately dashed. Kaestner turned
out to be a poor vehicle for, in essence, two reasons.
First, the case was not a compelling one. North Carolina’s
connection to the trust’s income was particularly weak.7 After
all, no distribution had been made to the beneficiary, and it was
possible that she would never receive one given the trustee’s discretion under the trust instrument.8 Thus, in seeking to tax the
income, North Carolina had to overcome a well-established tax

139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....”).
3 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2216.
4 Id.
5 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2018).
6 The Court overruled a Commerce Clause precedent in the sales tax context, explaining its concern that the precedent had created “market distortions”
and that it “has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter.” Id. at 2094.
7 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2218.
8 Id.
1
2
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norm: the imposition of the income tax generally requires either
receipt or, at the very least, a legal entitlement.9 Indeed, the majority emphasized the narrowness of its holding and the possibility
of a different outcome had additional contacts with the state been
present.10 The upside, if there is one, is that, in adopting a narrow holding, the Court has reserved wide latitude to address more
compelling cases in the future.
Second, the decision may reflect a fissure among the Justices on the application of stare decisis. Key precedents favored
the taxpayer. And reading between the lines, one can discern a
hesitation among at least some of the Justices in the majority to
“normalize” the overruling of precedent in the constitutional setting given the impending battle over abortion and other issues.
So, to the extent that North Carolina’s position hinged on the overruling of these key precedents, this larger battle may have cast a
critical shadow.
Perhaps because of this tension over stare decisis, finding
a more compelling vehicle may prove to be difficult. Indeed, one
week after its decision in Kaestner, the Court denied a certiorari
petition in a case where the contacts between the trust and the
state were much more substantial, permitting a state supreme
court decision upholding the strategy to stand.11
What, then, is the way forward for the states? Much is at
stake. For states that impose an income tax, designed to achieve
a more progressive distribution of the tax burden, taxing investment income is critical. Failure to eliminate the strategy will
certainly exacerbate inequality. Although the Kaestner decision is
problematic, it does, as it will be argued, leave a legislative path
for the states.
Part I provides an explanation of the out-of-state trust
strategy.12 It provides a brief policy critique of the strategy,
demonstrating that states would be able to easily close it down
were they not constrained by the due process limitations the Court
has imposed.

Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221.
11 Fielding v. Comm’r, 916 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. 2018), cert. denied, Bauerly
v. Fielding, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). For a discussion of the possible motivations for denying certiorari in Fielding, see infra Section III.B.
12 Infra Part I.
9

10
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Part II examines the Kaestner facts and the Court’s analAlthough, as suggested, the majority sought to limit its
holding, it did provide some concrete guidance, which is briefly
explored. The three-Justice concurring opinion argued that no
aspect of two taxpayer-friendly precedents should be reconsidered. The majority’s refusal to embrace these precedents on such
an expansive basis reflects, as will be argued, the tension among
the Justices over stare decisis.
Part III explores three options available to the states in
the face of Kaestner14: a wealth tax based on the value of the
beneficiary’s interest in the trust; use of what is referred to as
the founder’s principle, under which the trust is taxed in the
state where the grantor resides at its inception; and an expanded
application of the grantor-trust concept, which is currently employed on a more limited basis at the federal level to tax the
grantor on the trust’s income.15
Concluding that the first two options are questionable in
terms of validity or effectiveness, Part III suggests that the
states consider legislation that would embrace the grantor-trust
approach. Under this approach, a taxpayer who conveys assets
to an out-of-state discretionary trust for the benefit of family
members would remain taxable on all of the trust’s income. This
would largely, if not entirely, eliminate the strategy. Part III also
examines a fourth option available to the states, suggesting the
adoption of a throwback principle, referenced in Kaestner, to prevent
any remaining abuse that might escape the grantor-trust concept.
Part IV briefly argues against due process in the tax setting at a more fundamental level.16 If the precedents limiting the
states’ ability to tax out-of-state transactions (including Kaestner)
were overruled, the Commerce Clause could do the work that federalism requires in this context. This would not only give the
states more room to address abusive strategies but also give Congress the regulatory role it needs to establish uniform, sensible
tax policy across the country.
This Article concludes in the last few paragraphs.17


ysis.13

Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
15 Under I.R.C. section 671, trusts are ignored for federal tax purposes if they
meet certain conditions. The Code refers to such trusts as “grantor trusts.” Id.
16 Infra Part IV.
17 Infra Conclusion.
13
14
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I.THE OUT-OF-STATE TRUST STRATEGY (OR PROBLEM)
To illustrate the out-of-state trust problem, consider this
scenario: Taxpayer resides in a state that imposes an income tax
on its residents. Taxpayer has substantial investment assets and
would like to avoid paying state tax on the income those assets
generate. Perhaps, in addition, Taxpayer anticipates selling an
appreciated investment asset and would also like to avoid paying
state tax on the appreciation.
How might Taxpayer accomplish her objectives? She could
transfer the investment assets to a trustee located in a state without an income tax, with trust administration to occur in that
state (the situs state). If the trust instrument does not mandate
distribution to the beneficiaries, but instead gives the trustee
discretion regarding distributions, the income earned by the trust,
as well as any appreciation generated on the trust’s sale of the assets, could be accumulated in the trust free of state income tax.
The trust itself would not be required to pay any tax given
that the situs state does not impose an income tax. The beneficiaries, even if they live in a state with an income tax, would not be
subject to tax on the trust’s income if no distribution is made to
them. And the grantor would, as a general matter, not be required
to report the trust’s income on her state tax return. Note that the
effectiveness of the strategy hinges on the selection of an out-ofstate trustee: had Taxpayer instead selected an in-state trustee,
all the trust’s undistributed income could be taxed in the Taxpayer’s state.
In 2017, Congress enacted legislation that simultaneously
makes the out-of-state trust strategy both more attractive and
easier to accomplish.18 First, in terms of attractiveness, the 2017
changes limit the amount of state income tax that is deductible
on a federal return.19 If a taxpayer is not permitted to fully deduct (or deduct at all) her state income tax, the after-federal tax
cost of the state income tax is of course increased.20 The increased


Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
I.R.C. § 164(b)(6) (limiting deductions for state and local income and other
taxes to $10,000 for years 2018 through 2025).
20 Briefing Book: The State of State (and Local) Tax Policy, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-deduction-state-and
-local-taxes-work [https://perma.cc/R3NZ-ALEV].
18
19
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cost, in turn, creates greater incentive for taxpayers to engage in
strategies designed to reduce the amount of state income tax.21
Second, in terms of ease of accomplishment, in the past, the
federal gift tax served as a deterrent: taxpayers who made gifts,
whether in trust or outright, exposed themselves to gift tax liability.22 Thus, before adopting an out-of-state trust strategy, taxpayers had to consider the cost of the gift tax. Although taxpayers
found creative, complicated ways to implement the strategy while
sidestepping gift tax liability—surprisingly with some assistance
from the Internal Revenue Service in the form of taxpayerfriendly private letter rulings23—the 2017 legislation increased
gift exemptions to a level that make the gift tax irrelevant as a
practical matter to almost all taxpayers.24 With the gift tax thus
no longer as much of a deterrent, the out-of-state trust strategy
is less difficult to implement.
As a policy matter, the strategy is indefensible. As is the
case with most tax strategies, it results in inequity and inefficiency. Consider first the question of inequity. Horizontal equity
requires that two similarly situated taxpayers make the same
contribution to the cost of government.25 If a taxpayer is permitted to avoid state income tax by adopting the strategy, she makes
less of a contribution to the cost of state government than other
similarly situated taxpayers who opt against the strategy.
The strategy is also offensive as a matter of vertical equity,
which inquires whether differently situated taxpayers are required
to make an appropriately different contribution to the cost of government.26 Wealthier taxpayers, almost by definition, have more
investment assets than the less wealthy. To the extent they can use

Id.
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2012).
23 See Jeffrey Schoenblum, Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution,
Out-of-State Nongrantor Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of
State Income Taxation, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1945, 1963–67 (2014) (discussing the
strategy and favorable Internal Revenue Service private rulings making the
strategy possible).
24 I.R.C. § 2505 (2018); Rev. Proc. 2018-57 (federal gift tax exemption of
$11,400,000 in 2019).
25 See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity: the Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607–08 (1993).
26 See, e.g., id.
21
22
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the strategy to avoid paying income tax on the dividends, interest,
and gains these assets produce, they undercut the progressive
objectives the state income tax is designed to achieve. Moreover,
they tend to be better advised and will likely find the cost and
inconvenience of creating and maintaining an out-of-state trust to
be insignificant relative to the potential tax savings. All of this
will, as a practical matter, result in the wealthy disproportionately
implementing the strategy—permitting them to make a reduced
contribution to the cost of state government that is inappropriate relative to the contribution required of others.
Vertical equity is a significant issue at the state level.27
Those states that are somewhat successful in making their tax
system less regressive (or perhaps more progressive) rely on the
income tax to achieve this outcome.28 To the extent, however,
that these states are constitutionally required to permit taxpayers
to use the out-of-state trust strategy and thereby avoid income tax
on their investment returns, the states’ ability to redress inequality
is of course undermined—thus exacerbating vertical equity issues.29
As for inefficiency, tax strategies, in general, encourage
behaviors that have no purpose other than reduction in tax liability. Taxpayers who implement the out-of-state trust strategy
are required to create and maintain trusts that otherwise serve
no constructive purpose. In that sense, they are inefficient.30
Given this policy critique, the only question is how to eliminate the problem—in other words, to close down the out-of-state
trust as a tax-saving strategy. Absent constitutional constraints,

See, e.g., Who Pays: A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All
50 States (6th ed. 2018), INST. TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, https://itep.org/whopays/
[https://perma.cc/QK4Y-EZQL].
28 See id.
29 Achieving a progressive tax structure at the state level is difficult enough on
its own terms. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity:
Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51
UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1410 (2004). The out-of-state trust makes it even more difficult to achieve. Id.
30 Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax
Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Tax Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783,
794 (2015) (referencing Professor Bittker’s observation that inefficiency results
to the extent tax-incentive strategies are utilized and therefore impact behavior and that inequity results to the extent they are not).
27
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the solution would be straightforward. The strategy would fail to
work if the state in which the taxpayer resides could impose its
income tax on any trust created by one of its residents—or if, as in
Kaestner, the state in which the beneficiary resides could tax the
trust. But the difficulty is that the trustee would argue, as did the
Kaestner trust,31 that the Due Process Clause precludes the state
from taxing income in the absence of a sufficient contact with the
state. This argument was, of course, successful in Kaestner.32
Before turning to a consideration of the options available
to the states given Kaestner, a careful examination of the case is
first necessary.
II.EXAMINATION OF KAESTNER
A.Kaestner Facts
Almost 30 years ago, Joseph Rice III, a New York domiciliary, created a trust for the benefit of his children.33 He named a
New Yorker as trustee and made New York law controlling.34 He
continued to reside in New York.35 The trustee moved to Florida
in 1995, continuing to administer the trust until his retirement
in 2005.36 At that time, he was replaced by a new trustee, who
was domiciled in Connecticut and who has administered the trust
in the years since his appointment.37
At the trust’s inception, no beneficiary resided in North
Carolina.38 But, in 1997, Mr. Rice’s daughter, Kimberly Kaestner,39
moved to North Carolina and lived there during the relevant years

N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139
S. Ct. 2213, 2216 (2019).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2218.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Brief for Petitioner at 10, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (No. 18-457), 2019 WL 949892, at *10.
37 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2218 n.2.
38 Id. at 2218.
39 While the trust, as originally created, was for the benefit of Rice’s children, it was later divided into three subtrusts. As a result, a subtrust for the
benefit of Kaestner and her children was created with the same terms as the
original trust. This subtrust is the taxpayer before the Court. Id. at 2218.
31
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with her minor children.40 Under the terms of the trust, the trustee was given “absolute discretion” to distribute the trust assets to
the beneficiaries “in such amounts and proportions” as the trustee
might determine.41 At age 40, Kaestner would become entitled to
receive the trust assets outright.42 Under New York law, subject to
statutory limitations, a trustee may decant a trust and thereby
in effect amend its terms.43 And, in fact, after the tax years under consideration, the trustee used this authority to extend the
term of the trust to eliminate Kaestner’s right to receive the asset at age 40.44 He did so “after consulting with Kaestner and in
accordance with her wishes.”45
As North Carolina conceded, the beneficiaries’ residence in
the state was its only connection to the trust.46 The trust’s records
were maintained in New York.47 And the trust’s asset custodian
was located in Massachusetts.48 During the years in question, only
two meetings between Kaestner and the trustee occurred, both held
in New York.49 Kaestner did receive trust accountings,50 which
were presumably sent to her home.
Although the trust enjoyed significant income in the years at
issue, the trustee made no distribution.51 North Carolina sought to
tax the trust on its undistributed income, arguing that the beneficiaries’ residence was a sufficient connection to the State to overcome the due process argument made by the trust.52 The North
Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trust, concluding that the
imposition of the income tax on the trust’s undistributed income
was inconsistent with due process53 (but the court did not reach the
Dormant Commerce Clause issue54).


Id.
Id.
42 Id. at 2219.
43 N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b) (McKinney 2019).
44 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2219.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 2220.
47 Id. at 2218.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2218 n.3.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2220.
52 Id.
53 Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue,
814 S.E.2d 43, 50–51 (N.C. 2018).
54 Id. at 47.
40
41
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B.Court’s Decision
1.Narrow Holding
Ruling for the taxpayer, the Court adopted a narrow holding:
that, as a matter of due process, the presence of the beneficiaries
in North Carolina does not, in and of itself, permit the state to
impose its income tax on the trust’s undistributed income where
the beneficiaries have no right to demand the income and are
uncertain about receiving it in the future given the trustee’s discretion.55 As will be discussed, the concurring opinion makes the
narrowness of the majority’s holding even more apparent. Justice
Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Gorsuch, argued in the
concurring opinion that no aspect of two key taxpayer-friendly
precedents (Brooke v. Norfolk56 and Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Virginia57) should be open for re-examination. But the
majority resisted such a wholesale endorsement of these precedents,
instead limiting its holding and thus leaving itself wide latitude
in terms of future cases involving other factual permutations.58
2.No New Ground
The Court does not break new ground. It instead applies the
now-familiar standard for assessing due process limitations on state
taxes and adheres to several key precedents. It reiterates that, in
applying the standard, a two-pronged inquiry is required: first,
quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,59 the Court asks whether there
is “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax;” and second,
again quoting Quill, it asks whether “the income attributed to the

Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221. Later in the opinion, the Court intimates
that taxation in the state where the beneficiary resides would be permissible
where the beneficiary can “control, possess, enjoy, or receive trust assets.” Id.
This is somewhat inconsistent with the Court’s expressly stated holding, which
appears to suggest that such a tax would only be appropriate where the beneficiary has the right to demand and receive the income. See id.
56 See 277 U.S. 27, 28–29 (1928).
57 See 280 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1929).
58 See Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2226.
59 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).
55
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state for tax purposes” is “rationally related to ‘values connected
to the taxing state.’”60 It then concludes that the state was unable to satisfy the first prong, obviating the need to examine the
second one.61
Quoting from International Shoe Co. v. Washington,62 as
well as Quill, the Court elaborates that the first prong requires
“certain minimum contacts” with the state so that the tax “does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” If someone does not “derive ‘benefits and protection[s]’
from associating with a State,” she should not be subject to the
state’s taxing power.63
3.Analyzing Contacts in Trust Context
Applying these principles in the context of the Kaestner
trust, the Court does not focus on the trust as a distinct entity.64
Had it done so, its focus would have necessarily been limited to
the contacts between the trustee and the state, making the
grantor’s or the beneficiaries’ contacts with the state irrelevant.
Instead, the Court takes a more global approach, asking whether
the contacts of any of the trust’s “constituents” (trustee, grantor
or beneficiary)65 are sufficient to justify the tax. In the language
of the Court, contacts between the trust’s “constituents” and the
state may be considered “alone or in combination.”66 Questions will
inevitably arise about how to determine whether distinct contacts
are sufficient when considered in combination with each other.
Consideration will also need to be given to the relevance of
contacts other than the presence of an in-state beneficiary. Indeed,
as will be discussed,67 one week after the Kaestner decision, the

Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 306).
See id. at 2223–24.
62 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
63 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319).
64 Citing its decision in Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486
(1947), the Court does, however, acknowledge that a trust is generally treated as
a separate entity for federal income tax purposes. Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at
2218 n.1.
65 See id. at 2220.
66 Id.
67 See infra Section III.B.
60
61
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Court denied certiorari in Fielding v. Commissioner of Revenue,68
where the Supreme Court of Minnesota held the state’s tax on a
trust unconstitutional despite the presence of multiple contacts
in addition to the presence of an in-state beneficiary: the grantor’s residence in the state both at inception and during the tax
year; a provision in the trust instrument designating the state’s
law as controlling; a trust investment in a corporation having property physically located within the state; and the grantor’s use of
an in-state law firm to draft the trust instrument.69 The relevance and weight of such contacts will need to be considered in the
lower courts, if not eventually in the Supreme Court.
4.Majority Provides Some Concrete Guidance
While the Court does not go beyond its conclusion that the
mere presence of an in-state beneficiary is an insufficient contact, it does give some concrete guidance. First, citing Maguire v.
Trefry,70 it reiterates that where a distribution is made to the
beneficiary, the state where the beneficiary resides is permitted
to tax it as income.71
Second, citing Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport,72 it
points out that the state in which the trustee resides is permitted
to tax the trust.73
Third, citing Hanson v. Denckla,74 it indicates that the state
in which the trust is administered, its situs, is permitted to tax
the trust.75
Fourth, the Court explains that, in assessing a contact between an in-state beneficiary and an out-of-state trust, the
Court has focused on the “beneficiary’s right to control, possess,

68 916 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. 2018), cert. denied, Bauerly v. Fielding, 139 S.
Ct. 2773 (2019).
69 Id. at 330, 334.
70 253 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1920).
71 The Court also cites Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 21–23
(1938), for this proposition.
72 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
73 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139
S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2019).
74 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
75 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220.
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enjoy or receive trust assets.”76 While this principle is consistent
with well-accepted tax norms,77 questions may arise about its
implementation.
For example, if the beneficiary has the right to select the
people, other than herself, who will eventually be entitled to the
accumulated income (through what is known as a special power
of appointment78), would this constitute sufficient control? Or what
if the beneficiary has no present right to receive the accumulated
income but does have a right to receive it at some designated point
in the future?79 Implementing the Court’s rights-based principle
will require that these variations, as well as others, be addressed.
Fifth, citing Curry v. McCanless80 and Graves v. Elliot,81 the
Court observes that the grantor’s control over trust assets under


Id. at 2221.
Cf. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (stating
“taxpayers [must] have complete dominion” before income is realized for federal income tax purposes).
78 For a discussion of special powers of appointment, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
79 In Kaestner, as the record reflects, the beneficiary had such a special
power of appointment. 139 S. Ct. at 2218–19. But the Court does not make
reference to it, perhaps because it was eliminated through the decanting of
the trust. And, in Safe Deposit, the beneficiary was entitled to receive the accumulated income at the age of 25, but his descendants would instead receive
it if he failed to reach that age. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia,
280 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1929). Consider whether necessary control would be present if in a case like Safe Deposit if the beneficiary’s estate, rather than his
descendants, would be entitled to receive the accumulated income upon a failure
to reach age 25.
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, a Connecticut domiciliary was entitled to receive the out-of-state trust’s income. 733 A.2d 782, 788 (Conn. 1999).
In addition, she was entitled to receive the trust’s assets upon reaching the
age of 48. Id. In the event of an earlier death, she could control the disposition of
the assets through a special power of appointment (limited to her descendants). Id. While the parties agreed that the income to which she was entitled
was subject to Connecticut tax, there was disagreement about the trust’s undistributed capital gain (to which the beneficiary was not presently entitled).
Id. at 788 n.8. The court rejected the trust’s constitutional argument and upheld the tax on the undistributed capital gain, concluding that Safe Deposit
should no longer be followed. But given Kaestner, the question remains
whether the beneficiary’s rights in Gavin gave her sufficient control to justify
the Connecticut tax. For further discussion of Gavin, see infra Section III.B.1.
80 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
81 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
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administration in another state can serve as a basis for tax in the
state where the grantor resides.82
Sixth, citing Quill, it explains that it “borrows” from its
adjudicative jurisdiction cases in deciding the due process limitations on state taxation,83 although it refuses to decide whether
the jurisdictional principles established in Hanson v. Denckla are
controlling in the tax context.84
C.Concurring Opinion
Although the concurring opinion’s analysis is very similar
to the majority’s, it appears to suggest a willingness to enforce
due process limitations on state taxing power more stringently than
the majority. Three aspects of the opinion suggest a basis for such
an inference.
First, as indicated, the opinion begins with a caution to
the effect that no points resolved in two pro-taxpayer precedents
(Brooke and Safe Deposit) are open for reconsideration.85 While
the majority cites these cases and integrates them into its analysis, it does not go as far as the concurring opinion’s caution
about the extent to which they are binding.86
Second, unlike the majority opinion, the concurring opinion does not reference the cumulative approach to contacts
adopted by the majority. So, while the majority opinion may be
read to contemplate the possibility of considering, say, a grantor
contact in combination with a beneficiary contact in determining
whether the necessary connection to the taxing state exists,87 the
concurring Justices would likely find this objectionable. Indeed,

In Curry, the grantor had retained, in the Court’s words, the “power to
dispose” of property in an out-of-state trust in the form of a general power of
appointment. The Court upheld the estate tax on the trust assets imposed in
the state where the grantor had resided. Similarly, in Graves, the grantor
had created an out-of-state trust subject to retained control in the form of a
revocation power, and the Court again upheld the estate tax imposed by the
state of residence.
83 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220; see also Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 342 (1954) (stating that jurisdiction is necessary before state can exercise taxing power or judicial authority).
84 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2224 n.11.
85 Id. at 2226 (Alito, J., concurring).
86 But see id. at 2221–22.
87 Id. at 2220.
82
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as will be discussed, the Safe Deposit Court, in finding insufficient contacts, did not take the grantor’s connection to the taxing
state into account—and, as indicated, the concurring Justices are
unwilling to reconsider any aspect of this precedent.88
Third, the concurring Justices’ discussion of the decision
in Brooke is telling—pointing out that the Brooke Court had
characterized the beneficiary as a mere “stranger” vis-à-vis trust
assets and thus revealing their view that a discretionary beneficiary bears an attenuated relationship to trust assets.89 Moreover,
under Brooke, the concurring Justices emphasize, even if an instate beneficiary is legally entitled to receive income, that is not
a justification for taxing an out-of-state trust’s assets.90 Although
the majority Justices appear to agree with this characterization
of Brooke,91 it is less clear that they are prepared to treat this
aspect of the decision as binding.
In sum, while the majority seeks to retain wide latitude in
terms of future cases, the concurring Justices do not want the
decision to be understood as inviting or permitting arguments that
would call into question any aspect of Safe Deposit or Brooke.
III.AVAILABLE OPTIONS
Given Kaestner, what options are available to the states?
Four are considered: a wealth tax; the founder’s principle; an
expanded application of the grantor-trust concept; and a throwback rule. Neither the wealth tax nor the founder’s principle
would be an ideal solution—the former because it would likely
be ineffective as a practical matter and the latter because it
would raise constitutional questions. The other two options are
more appealing. The Kaestner Court, it will be suggested, left a
discernible path for an enhanced grantor-trust concept. And it
explicitly signaled that the states could adopt a throwback rule
to address the problem. Implemented together, the grantor-trust
concept and the throwback principle could provide an effective
and constitutionally permissible solution.

See infra Section III.C.4.
Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2227 (Alito, J., concurring).
90 Id. (citing Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27, 28–29 (1928)).
91 Id. at 2221 (describing Brooke and Safe Deposit in a manner that is consistent with the description in the concurring opinion).
88
89
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A.Wealth Tax
Does Kaestner—along with its reaffirmance of Safe Deposit—
suggest that the state where the beneficiary resides is entirely
precluded from taxing the beneficiary with respect to the trust in
the absence of additional contacts? A close reading of Safe Deposit
suggests otherwise. In Safe Deposit, Virginia, where the beneficiary
resided,92 sought to impose a tax on the entire trust corpus,93 which
was in the possession of the trustee in Maryland.94 In finding the
tax objectionable on due process grounds,95 the Court indicated
that the tax did not target the value of the beneficiary’s equitable
interest in the trust but rather the entire corpus.96 And because
the assets were located in Maryland, the tax was invalidated.97
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stone emphasized that
Virginia had failed to limit the tax to the value of the beneficiary’s equitable interest in the trust, implying that the tax
would have been upheld had it been so limited.98 In Commonwealth v. Stewart,99 cited in Kaestner,100 the court embraced this
implication, upholding a tax imposed by the state in which the
beneficiary resided based on the value of the beneficiary’s equitable interest, even though the trust was under administration

Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 91 (1929).
Id. at 90.
94 Id. at 91.
95 Id. at 94.
96 Id. at 92 (“The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair value of any
interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens is not
now presented for consideration.”).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 95 (Stone, J., concurring) (“... the question whether the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids a tax on the beneficiaries, in Virginia, where they are
domiciled, measured by their equitable interests, seems to me not to be presented .... No attempt was made by Virginia to tax the equitable interests of
the beneficiaries of the trust. That the thing taxed or the measure of the tax
is different from the equitable interests of the beneficiaries, as affected by the
specified contingencies, sufficiently appears from the fact that the one may
well have been of different value than the other. In fact, the securities seem to
have been assessed at their full value, although the equitable interests of the
beneficiaries are less than the whole.”).
99 12 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1940), aff’d., 312 U.S. 649 (1941).
100 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139
S. Ct. 2213, 2223 n.10 (2019).
92
93
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in another state.101 And, in Kaestner itself, the Court describes
Safe Deposit and Brooke in terms suggesting that a wealth tax
would be permissible, indicating that “[i]n each case the challenged tax fell on the entirety of a trust’s property, rather than
on only the share of trust assets to which the beneficiaries were
entitled.”102 All of this is consistent with the principle that, as a
general matter, the state in which the taxpayer resides is permitted to tax all of her property.103


Somewhat analogously, in the corporate context, the Court has upheld
a tax imposed by the state in which the shareholder resided based on the value
of shares. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937)
(“But we have recently had occasion to point out that enjoyment by the resident of a state of the protection of its laws is inseparable from responsibility
for sharing the costs of its government, and that a tax measured by the value
of rights protected is but an equitable method of distributing the burdens of
government among those who are privileged to enjoy its benefits.”). Similarly,
in Blodgett v. Silberman, distinguished in Safe Deposit, the Court upheld the
Connecticut estate tax on the value of a partnership interest owned by the
decedent, who had been domiciled in the state, even though some of the partnership’s assets were located elsewhere. 277 U.S. 1, 12 (1928); see also Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968) (“Any formula
used must bear a rational relationship, both on its face and in its application,
to property values connected with the taxing State.”).
102 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221. Note also that the concurring opinion, in
its only footnote, explains that, in Brooke, the beneficiary had a right to income but not trust corpus and that the Court had held that taxing the beneficiary on the corpus was not permissible. Id. at 2227 (Alito, J., concurring).
This would suggest the concurring Justices would not find a wealth tax on
the value of the beneficiary’s entitlement to be problematic.
103 Under several precedents, the Court makes a distinction between income tax and property tax. Resident taxpayers are taxable on income derived
from all sources, including out-of-state sources. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995). On the other hand, in the case of a
property tax, an important limitation applies: tangible property located in another
state is not taxable in the state of the taxpayer’s residence. Greenough v. Tax
Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 492 (1947). In the case of intangible personal property, the state of the taxpayer’s residence is permitted to tax it
even if located in another state. Id. An amicus brief in Kaestner sought to distinguish Safe Deposit on the ground that it involved a tax on out-of-state
property, whereas Kaestner involved a tax on income. Brief of Tax Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Kaestner, 139 S. Ct.
2213 (2019) (No. 18-457), 2019 WL 1093046, at *16. But because the property
in Safe Deposit was intangible, the limitation on the state’s taxing power with
respect to property was inapplicable—thus placing Kaestner and Safe Deposit on
an equal footing in the sense that in neither case was the property-tax limitation relevant. See Greenough, 331 U.S. at 492. For an argument critiquing
101
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To be sure, a wealth tax imposed on the value of a beneficiary’s equitable interest is a possible response to the out-of-state
trust problem. But given that, in a case like Kaestner, it could
constitutionally target only the value of the beneficiary’s equitable interest, rather than the value of the assets in the trust, it
would be less than an ideal solution. Faced with such a tax, advisers could draft out-of-state trusts on a discretionary basis (as
the Kaestner trust was drafted) in order to minimize the value of
the beneficiary’s equitable interest and thereby substantially
reduce—or practically eliminate—the tax. For if the beneficiary
had no entitlement to receive trust assets but only the hope that
the trustee might exercise discretion in her favor, valuing the
beneficiary’s interest would require taking into account the possibility that the trustee might decide to distribute to other beneficiaries
or to withhold distributions entirely.104
Professor Carla Spivack argues that the Kaestner beneficiaries’ residence in North Carolina should have been a sufficient


the property-tax limitation, see Boris I. Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State
Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947).
104 See Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 95 (1929) (Stone, J.,
concurring); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 12 A.2d 444, 449 (Pa. 1940) (acknowledging potential difficulty in valuing equitable interest); cf. Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-2
C.B. 324 (acknowledging the difficulty in valuing an interest subject to the
control of another).
Note that, in Kaestner, the Court, in its parenthetical description of Stewart, muddies things by including a quotation from the decision to the effect
that the Stewart beneficiary had a “right to the income.” Kaestner, 139 S. Ct.
at 2223 n.10. Reading this would suggest that it would be impermissible for
the state of the beneficiary’s residence to tax the value of a discretionary interest under a wealth tax and would be difficult to reconcile with basic principles. See supra text accompanying note 102. The Court muddied the issue
even further in its discussion of the inability of the Kaestner beneficiary to
voluntarily transfer her interest. While emphasizing the language in the trust
instrument prohibiting such transfers, Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2223, the Court
goes on to state that the question whether a different outcome would be appropriate in the absence of such a prohibition is not resolved. Id. at 2223 n.9.
To be sure, the beneficiary’s inability to transfer her interest in the trust would
certainly be relevant in valuing the interest under a wealth tax. But it would
be wrong to read Kaestner as precluding the states from imposing a wealth tax
on such an interest. After all, the Court was focusing on the level of the beneficiary’s control over the trust’s undistributed income, not whether the beneficiary had a valuable interest that could be subjected to a wealth tax. See id.
at 2223.
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constitutional justification for the imposition of North Carolina’s
income tax on the trust’s undistributed income (or perhaps a tax
on the beneficiaries based on the trust’s undistributed income).105
She argues that the beneficiaries’ equitable interest in the trust
constitutes a property interest that is an appropriate subject of
taxation in their state of residence.106 This is consistent with the
general rule that the state in which a taxpayer resides is permitted
to tax all property owned by the taxpayer.107 But, given Kaestner
as well as Safe Deposit, this does not justify the imposition of an
income tax on the undistributed income of an out-of-state trust.
As suggested, it would justify a wealth or property tax on the
value of the beneficiary’s equitable interest in the trust, which,
as Professor Spivack indicates, is a property interest.108
Although initially attractive, Professor Spivack’s theory—
that a beneficiary’s equitable interest is a property interest that
confers taxing authority on the state of residence—does not support her conclusion—that this property interest justifies an income tax on the trust’s undistributed income.109 Indeed, North
Carolina did not argue that its income tax could somehow be defended as a property tax on the beneficiary’s equitable interest.
More important, even assuming North Carolina had imposed a
property tax on the beneficiary, rather than its income tax on the
trust, the value of the equitable interest, as suggested, would
have likely proven to be insignificant once the trustee’s discretion was taken into account. All of which is to say that a wealth
tax is not a sufficient solution to the out-of-state trust problem.
B.Founder’s Principle
Some state tax statutes focus on the residence or domicile
of the grantor at the time of the trust’s creation.110 Under these


Carla Spivack, Due Process, State Taxation of Trusts and the Myth of
the Powerless Beneficiary: A Response to Bridget Crawford and Michelle Simon,
67 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46, 54 (2019).
106 Id.
107 See Greenough, 331 U.S. at 492 (permitting the state of residence to tax
even out-of-state non-tangible property).
108 See, e.g., Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937) (equitable interest in
trust is property); United States v. Harris, 854 F.3d 1053, 1056 (2017) (beneficiary’s discretionary interest in trust is property).
109 See Spivack, supra note 105, at 54.
110 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7b(a)(2) (2019).
105
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statutes, the trust is treated as if it were a resident and is therefore
taxed on all of its income—not just in-state income—if the grantor
was domiciled or resided in the state at the trust’s inception.111
Hence, the term “founder’s principle” is used. If constitutionally
valid, the principle could largely eliminate the out-of-state trust
problem: the state of the grantor’s residence would be permitted
to tax the trust on an ongoing basis.112
In Fielding v. Commissioner of Revenue,113 however, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the principle is inconsistent with Safe Deposit and therefore violates due process. One
week after its decision in Kaestner, the Court denied Minnesota’s
certiorari petition in Fielding,114 raising questions about the extent to which the principle retains viability.
1.High Watermark
The principle perhaps reached its high watermark in the
Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Chase Manhattan Bank
v. Gavin.115 Under the Connecticut statute, an inter vivos trust
is treated as a resident trust if the grantor was a resident when
the trust became irrevocable—though it is treated otherwise if there
is no current Connecticut beneficiary.116 In Gavin, the grantor
created an inter vivos trust at a time when he was a Connecticut
domiciliary.117 During the tax year, a beneficiary resided in the
state, although the grantor had previously died.118
The facts in Safe Deposit, where the Court invalidated
Virginia’s tax, were strikingly similar: the grantor in Safe Deposit
created an inter vivos (revocable) trust in Maryland while domiciled
in Virginia for the benefit of a beneficiary in Virginia.119 After the

Id.
Steve R. Akers, ACTEC 2018 Annual Meeting Musings, BESSEMER TR.
(Mar. 2018), https://www.bessemertrust.com/sites/default/files/2018-07/ACTEC
%202018%20Annual%20Meeting%20Musings_WEBSITE.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4JG2-HF22].
113 Fielding v. Comm’r of Revenue, 916 N.W.2d 323, 330–32 (Minn. 2018),
cert. denied, Bauerly v. Fielding, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019).
114 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019).
115 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999).
116 Id. at 789–90.
117 Id. at 801–03.
118 Id.
119 Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 89–92 (1929).
111
112
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grantor’s death, Virginia imposed a tax on the trust at a time
when the beneficiary still resided in Virginia.120 The Court held
that the tax violated due process, concluding that there were insufficient contacts with Virginia to justify it.121 Unable to distinguish Safe Deposit, the Gavin court determined that Safe Deposit
had been undermined by later Supreme Court decisions and that it
should therefore no longer be followed.122 Finding no due process
violation, the court sustained the Connecticut tax on all of the
trust’s income, leaving open the question whether the founder’s
principle is available where there is no in-state beneficiary.123
2.“Low Watermark:” Principle Unequivocally Rejected
If, as suggested, the principle reached a high watermark
in Gavin, it reached a “low watermark”—or its nadir—in Fielding.
Under the Minnesota statute,124 as in the case of the Connecticut
statute, a trust is treated as a resident trust if the grantor was
domiciled in the state at inception or when the trust later becomes irrevocable.125 All of a resident trust’s income, even if derived from out-of-state sources, is taxable in Minnesota.126 If, on
the other hand, the trust is treated as a non-resident, it is taxable
only on income from in-state (Minnesota) sources.127
In Fielding, a Minnesota domiciliary created an out-of-state
trust in 2011.128 Three years after the trust became irrevocable, in
2014, when the grantor was still domiciled in the state, Minnesota
sought to tax the trust on income from out-of-state sources.129
Ruling for the trust, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
mere fact that the grantor was domiciled in the state at inception was an insufficient contact for due process purposes.130
The court reasoned that the tax was not imposed on the
grantor, but rather on the trust, and that he no longer had control

Id.
Id. at 94.
122 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 802.
123 Id. at 786.
124 MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7b(a)(2) (2019).
125 Fielding v. Comm’r, 916 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 2018).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 326.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 330–31.
120
121
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over the trust assets in 2014.131 The focus, according to the court,
must be on the relationship between the taxpayer—the trust, which
the court treats as an entity separate from the grantor and the
beneficiaries—and the state.132 The grantor’s contact with the
state at the trust’s inception did not count for due process purposes,
under the court’s analysis, given that he no longer had control over
the trust assets in 2014.133 Nor, parenthetically, did the existence
of a beneficiary in Minnesota through 2014 count.134 Relying in
part on Safe Deposit, the court rejected the founder’s principle.135
Although this reading of Safe Deposit is certainly a reasonable one, consider an alternative one. As indicated, the grantor
in Safe Deposit had died before New York sought to tax the trust.136
It is therefore possible to read Safe Deposit narrowly: whatever
the status of the founder’s principle as a general matter, it could
not be invoked once the grantor had died. Even if, in other words,
the grantor’s residence in the taxing state at inception could be a
sufficient contact, it ceased to be relevant in Safe Deposit at the
grantor’s death.


Id.
Id. Contrast this with the Kaestner Court’s conclusion that a trust “is
not a distinct legal entity.” N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2218 (2019) (quoting Americold Realty Tr.
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016)).
133 Fielding, 916 N.W.2d at 330–31. Note, however, that the court’s treatment of the grantor’s connection to the trust as irrelevant is not consistent
with Kaestner, where the Court indicates that connections between the state
and (i) the grantor, (ii) the trustee, and/or (iii) the beneficiaries are to be considered alone or in combination with each other in determining the sufficiency of the contact with the taxing state. Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220.
134 Fielding, 916 N.W.2d at 331.
135 See also Linn v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2 N.E.3d 1203, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013) (indicating the state could cite “no cases finding a grantor’s in-state
residency is a sufficient connection for due process with an inter vivos trust”
and concluding tax on out-of-state trust’s undistributed income was constitutionally impermissible); Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990) (tax on undistributed income constitutionally impermissible even
though grantor resided in the state when she created the revocable trust and
when it became irrevocable at her death); Residuary Tr. A v. Dir., 27 N.J. Tax
68, 76 (2013) (rejecting Gavin’s use of settlor’s domicile as a sufficient basis to
tax out-of-state trusts); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Murphy, 203
N.E.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. 1964) (rejecting New York’s argument that, because
grantor was domiciled in the state when his revocable trust became irrevocable at his death, it could tax its undistributed income).
136 Mercantile-Safe Deposit, 203 N.E.2d at 491.
131
132
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Whether this narrow reading is correct was important in
Fielding, where the grantor was still alive and residing in Minnesota when the tax was imposed. Under a more expansive reading,
adopted by the Fielding court, Safe Deposit rejected the founder’s
principle in its entirety, making the grantor’s residence in the state,
either at inception or during the tax year, an insufficient contact.
Which reading is correct—or, more accurately, which one will ultimately prevail—is of course an open question. But to the extent
the Fielding reading is correct, states will not be able to employ the
founder’s principle as a solution to the out-of-state trust problem.
3.Fault Line in Supreme Court: Stare Decisis
Why didn’t the Court grant Minnesota’s certiorari petition
in Fielding to resolve which of these readings is correct? Had it done
so, it would have had an opportunity to address not only the validity of the founder’s principle but also other issues Kaestner left
unresolved. Why, therefore, did the petition fail to secure the necessary (four) votes? Although of course necessarily speculative, the
answer may lie in the tension among the Justices over stare decisis.
The Kaestner majority stressed the narrowness of its holding:
to the extent a state seeks to justify a tax on the undistributed
income of an out-of-state trust solely on the basis of the beneficiary’s
residence, it violates due process unless the beneficiary has control
over the income.137 And in rejecting North Carolina’s argument that
Safe Deposit had been implicitly overruled, the majority maintained
that “[t]he aspects of the case noted here are consistent with the
pragmatic approach reflected in” other cases.138 The majority was,
in other words, anxious to avoid overruling Safe Deposit while
leaving for future consideration as much of the case as possible.
This of course leaves the status of aspects of Safe Deposit not
implicated in Kaestner unresolved.
The concurring Justices, on the other hand, twice indicate
in the course of a rather short opinion that every aspect of Safe
Deposit, as well as Brooke, remains binding—and further indicate
that nothing in the majority opinion should be read to suggest
otherwise.139 Perhaps the four liberal Justices, who formed part
of the majority, refused to vote in favor of Minnesota’s certiorari

See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221 n.6.
139 Id. at 2226–28 (Alito, J., concurring).
137
138
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petition out of concern that a decision in Fielding to overrule any
aspect of Safe Deposit (or Brooke) would be cited by the other
side in a battle over abortion and the validity of Roe v. Wade.140 So,
plausibly, from the vantage point of the four liberal Justices, the
safer strategy was to embrace as little of Safe Deposit and Brooke as
necessary in Kaestner and to avoid the fuller examination of these
cases that a grant of certiorari in Fielding would have entailed.141
In short, it may well be that the denial of certiorari in
Fielding, together with the decision in Kaestner, has more to do
with stare decisis than state taxing power. As suggested, the
concurring Justices in Kaestner were explicit about their unwillingness to reconsider any aspect of Safe Deposit, a precedent on
which the Fielding court relied.142 And at least some of those in
the majority may not have wanted to take a position in Fielding,
or Kaestner, that would “normalize” the overruling of precedent
given the dispute over abortion, as well as other issues, that is
perhaps on the horizon. So the denial of certiorari in Fielding,
together with the decision in Kaestner, may simply reflect the
fault line developing in the Court over stare decisis.143


410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe).
141 An additional dynamic may also help explain the tension among the
Justices: the typical conservative-liberal divide over economic issues. See,
e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW
PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 4–5, n.10 (2019). Whereas
the liberal Justices may have been concerned about distributive implications
and the resulting inequity, the conservative Justices who wrote or joined in
the concurring opinion may have been more sensitive to a different set of issues: the need to minimize government intervention, concern about the scope
of the states’ taxing power and the related question of federalism. But see South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018) (conservative Justices (but
not Chief Justice Roberts) voting to permit the states to adopt legislation designed to close down a “judicially created tax shelter”).
142 It is not without irony that, on the very same day Kaestner was decided,
the three concurring Justices joined (or wrote) the majority decision in Knick v.
Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), which overruled a 1985 precedent under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause (Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
While thus willing to overrule a 1985 precedent, the three concurring Justices
simultaneously declared that 1928 and 1929 due process precedents are beyond re-examination, in effect peremptorily announcing their views on cases
involving different fact patterns that may eventually come before the Court.
143 A similar dynamic could play out should a wealth tax be enacted. In
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895), the Court held
140
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4.Impact on the Founder’s Principle
Where does this leave the founder’s principle? None of the
six Justices in the majority makes their thinking explicit about
whether Safe Deposit’s rejection of the principle should be modified
or overruled. There was no need for the majority to do so given
that the Kaestner grantor resided in New York, not North Carolina,
when he created the trust.144 Resolving the issue before the Court,
i.e., determining whether North Carolina could tax the trust based
solely on the residence of an in-state beneficiary, did not require
a more extensive examination of Safe Deposit.
But if, for example, a case with Fielding-type facts—an instate beneficiary and a grantor residing in the state at inception
and during the tax year as well—were to come before the Court,

that a tax on income from property was a direct tax and was therefore unconstitutional because not apportioned as required in Article I, section 9, clause
4—the Court having earlier held that a tax on real property was also a direct
tax. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881). If this aspect of Pollock
remains viable, a wealth tax would likely fail as an unapportioned direct
tax. Arguing in support of a wealth tax, some maintain, however, that Pollock
should be overruled in favor of the Court’s earlier approach in Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796), under which the direct-tax concept was given
narrow scope. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999). The adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, the argument goes, undermined Pollock entirely. Id. at 5. In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, however, Chief Justice Roberts intimated
that a critical aspect of Pollock remains intact, observing that the Court had
applied the Pollock principle that income from property is a direct tax even
after the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted. 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012) (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1920)). While this point was
made only by the Chief Justice, one could easily imagine that the liberal justices—
concerned about the impact on Roe v. Wade—would be unwilling to declare
Pollock dead, just as they were unwilling to overrule Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929) and Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27
(1928). If this proves to be the case, an unapportioned wealth tax would likely
be declared unconstitutional, not only by the conservative justices who refused to
revisit these pro-taxpayer precedents in Kaestner, but also by the liberal justices.
Parenthetically, a wealth tax could plausibly be saved from constitutional
challenge by giving taxpayers an election: voluntarily choose to pay the wealth tax
or instead be subject to a higher income tax rate (or perhaps a higher estate tax
rate). See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 574 n.11 (upholding a tax on those
who chose not to comply with the individual mandate in Obamacare even though
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to impose the mandate directly).
144 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2218.
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the Justices in the majority would need to undertake such an
examination. In doing so, they could, for example, decide that
the grantor’s residence at inception, in conjunction with an in-state
beneficiary, is a sufficient contact. Or they could decide that, even
if there is no in-state beneficiary, the grantor’s residence at inception is a sufficient contact in itself. In either case, they would
need to overrule Safe Deposit. Or they might decide not to overrule it but to read it narrowly, limiting it to its facts and thus
making it permissible for the state to impose its tax where both
the grantor and a beneficiary continue to reside in the state during the tax year.145
On the other hand, the three concurring Justices, having
concluded that every aspect of Safe Deposit remains binding,146
would surely reject the founder’s principle. Thus, in a case where
the state seeks to tax a trust solely on the basis of the grantor’s
residence at the trust’s inception, the concurring Justices would
undoubtedly find a violation of due process. And even if there
were, in addition, an in-state beneficiary at the time the tax was
imposed, they would presumably reach the same conclusion given
the presence of such a beneficiary in Safe Deposit. Thus, in a case
like Gavin, where there was an in-state beneficiary and the deceased grantor had resided in the state at inception, the concurring Justices would likely invalidate the tax (contrary to the Gavin
court’s holding).147 But in a case where the grantor was still alive, as

The majority indicates that, in assessing the grantor’s connection to the
trust, the grantor’s level of control over the trust assets is the critical determinant. Id. at 2222. And while the majority does go on to say that it does not
decide what level of control would suffice to justify a tax on the trust imposed
by the state of the grantor’s residence, id. at 2222 n.7, the clear implication is
that some level of control would be essential. See id. This would appear to be
inconsistent with the founder’s principle, which does not depend on continuing control. But whether continuing control would be required where the
grantor resided in the state at inception (and perhaps still lives in the state)
and where there is also an in-state beneficiary is not clear.
146 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
147 Although the facts in Gavin are very similar to those in Kaestner, one
factual distinction makes it difficult to predict how the Justices in the
Kaestner majority would view a case like Gavin. In Kaestner, the beneficiary’s
residence in North Carolina was the only basis for imposing the tax. 139 S.
Ct. at 2218. The grantor did not reside in North Carolina at inception or otherwise. Id. In Gavin, in contrast, the grantor did reside in the taxing state
145
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in Fielding, whether the concurring Justices would adopt an expansive or narrow reading of Safe Deposit remains unclear—although
one could reasonably speculate that they would opt for the former
given their emphatic embrace of all aspects of the decision.
5.Borrowing Jurisdictional Considerations
The validity of the founder’s principle could possibly also be
influenced by jurisdictional considerations. As suggested, Kaestner
indicates that the Court borrows from its adjudicative-jurisdiction
cases in applying due process in the tax context.148 In Hanson v.
Denckla,149 a foundational jurisdiction case, cited in Kaestner,150
the Court determined that a Florida court lacked jurisdiction over a
Delaware trustee even though the person who created the trust, as
well a beneficiary, resided in Florida at the time of the litigation.151
If Hanson were applied on a parallel basis in the tax context, it could possibly cut against the founder’s principle. For if
the courts in a state where the grantor resides at the time of litigation are not permitted to exercise jurisdiction over an out-ofstate trustee on that basis, a tax imposed on a trust by the state
where the grantor resided when it was created might similarly
fail for lack of connection between the trustee and the taxing
state.152 The founder’s principle might therefore be vulnerable to

(Connecticut) at inception. 733 A.2d 782, 787 (Conn. 1999). Given the apparent
willingness of the Justices in the majority to combine different contacts, Kaestner,
139 S. Ct. at 2220, it is possible that they would treat the grantor’s residence
in Connecticut at inception, in conjunction with the residence of a beneficiary
in the state during the tax year, as a sufficient basis for taxing the trust.
148 Id. at 2224 n.11.
149 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
150 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220, 2224 n.11.
151 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251–52.
152 In Hanson, in concluding that the Florida courts lacked jurisdiction
over the Delaware trustee, the Court indicates that the grantor resided in
Pennsylvania, not Florida, when she created the trust. Id. at 252. To the extent
this can be read to imply that the Pennsylvania courts would have had jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, it would lend support to the founder’s principle.
It would, however, ordinarily be inconsistent with the parties’ expectations (trustee
and grantor)—and perhaps therefore inconsistent with due process principles—to
allow the courts in the state where the grantor resides at inception to exercise
adjudicative jurisdiction over the trustee solely on that basis. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 267 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“reasonable
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attack not only on the basis of how Safe Deposit is read—or indeed whether it is partially overruled—but also on the basis of a
“borrowing” from the adjudicative-jurisdiction analysis in Hanson.
6.Founder’s Principle v. Situs and Jurisdictional
Considerations
Jurisdictional considerations may account for what would
otherwise be a subtle distinction between the founder’s principle
and the concept, endorsed in Kaestner, permitting the state where
the trust is under administration (the trust’s situs) to impose its
tax.153 Consider, for example, a testamentary trust, typically
having its situs in the state where the decedent was domiciled
and her will admitted to probate.154 Courts in the situs state have
jurisdiction over the trustee and all beneficiaries concerning
matters of administration, even if they have no other contact with
the situs state.155 Permitting the situs state to exercise such jurisdiction is perhaps driven by practical necessity: were it otherwise,
in the case where beneficiaries reside in different states, no one forum would be available to resolve with finality all trust-related
disputes. And because the situs state offers its courts as such a
forum, Kaestner sensibly permits taxation in the situs state.156
If, however, the trust was to change its situs to another
state, the original state could no longer rely on situs as a justification for imposing its tax. Income earned in years after the
change would cease to be taxable, in other words, in the original
state. Under the founder’s principle, in contrast, the state of the

to infer in most situations that the testator or settlor expected the trustee to
administer the trust at his or its place of business or domicil [sic]”—although
comment d. indicates that trustees may be subject to jurisdiction of other courts
where there is an appropriate basis); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474 (1985) (discussing whether it was reasonably foreseeable defendant
would be required to litigate in forum state is critical to due process analysis).
153 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220 (“tax based on the site of trust administration is constitutional”).
154 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539,
545 (D.C. 1997) (testamentary trust has situs in state of decedent’s domicile
and, therefore, state is constitutionally permitted to impose its tax given the
benefits it offered of “continuing, principal jurisdiction” over the trust).
155 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1959).
156 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220.
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decedent’s domicile might be permitted to continue taxing the
trust indefinitely even if, during the tax year, there was no other
contact to justify the tax.157 Thus, the reach of the founder’s
principle is potentially more expansive and, as a result, perhaps
more difficult, unless cabined, to defend constitutionally.
In the end, whether or not the founder’s principle remains
viable as an effective solution to the out-of-state trust problem
remains unclear. To be sure, the Kaestner Court did not address
the question. But the lack of a single vote to overrule any aspect
of Safe Deposit, along with the denial of certiorari in Fielding—a
compelling case for application of the principle158—is telling.159
C.Grantor Trust: Taxing the Grantor on the Trust’s Income
1.Background
In a series of private letter rulings,160 the IRS has approved
a technique that enables taxpayers to use an out-of-state trust more


In Linn v. Department of Revenue, the state made just such a claim, but
the court rejected it. 2 N.E.3d 1203, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); see also Blue v. Dep’t
of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting founder’s
principle, invoked by state, where “no ongoing protection or benefit to the
trust”); Fielding v. Comm’r, 916 N.W.2d 323, 333 (Minn. 2018) (“existing relationship” between trust and state required).
158 In Fielding, not only was the grantor domiciled in Minnesota at the
trust’s inception, he continued to be domiciled in the state when the trust became irrevocable and during the tax year in question. 916 N.W.2d at 330. In
addition, a beneficiary was also domiciled in the state. Id. And the trust owned
stock in a Minnesota Subchapter S corporation (i.e., a corporation that passes
its income through to its shareholders, here the trust), which in turn owned
property physically located in the state. Id. at 331. Finally, a Minnesota law
firm drafted the instrument, which made the state’s law controlling. Compare
id., with Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (choice-oflaw provision, although not determinative, not to be ignored).
159 Were a case to arise where the only contact was the grantor’s residence
at inception, it seems unlikely that any of the Justices in the majority would
find this a sufficient contact. For, in the case of grantor-based contacts, the
majority indicated that the grantor’s level of retained control should be the
focus. Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222 n.7. While the majority indicated that the
necessary level of control remains an open question, a requirement of some
level of continuing control is apparently contemplated. Id.
160 Many such rulings have now been issued. For a sample of recent ones,
see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-25-006 (June 21, 2019); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2019-25-005 (June 21, 2019); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-08-005 (Feb. 22, 2019);
157
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easily.161 Under the technique, a taxpayer in a state that imposes
an income tax conveys investment assets to a trust.162 The trust is
drafted to make sure that it does not constitute a grantor trust for
federal tax purposes.163 If it were a grantor trust, all of the trust’s
income would be taxable for federal purposes on the grantor’s tax
return.164 But if the trust is drafted to make it a non-grantor
trust, its income is not taxable to the grantor for federal purposes.165
And to the extent that the state follows federal law, the trust’s
income would not be reported on the grantor’s state income tax
return either.166 If, as is always the case, the trust is located in a
state without an income tax, the trust’s undistributed income is
not subject to state income tax—thereby permitting the grantor
to avoid her home state’s income tax on investment income.167
Prior to the private letter rulings, the difficulty with the
technique had been the federal gift tax. Typically, when assets
are conveyed to a non-grantor trust, gift tax liability is triggered,
resulting in a cost that would ordinarily deter taxpayers from
adopting the technique.168 But, surprisingly unconcerned about
the impact on the states, the IRS approved a structure in the rulings under which the trust is treated as a non-grantor trust for
income tax purposes even though the creation of the trust did
not result in a completed gift for gift tax purposes or any gift tax
liability.169 Thus, taxpayers using this technique could freely
(i.e., without paying gift tax170) transfer investment assets to a


I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-08-004 (Feb. 22, 2019); and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2019-08-003 (Feb. 22, 2019).
161 For a discussion of the strategy, see Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1963–67.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (“grantor takes into account in
computing the grantor’s income tax liability all items of income, deduction,
and credit to which the grantor would have been entitled had the trust not
been in existence ....”).
165 See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1963–67.
166 Most states follow the federal grantor-trust rules. Id. at 1964.
167 Id.
168 See Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes—Questions and Answers, IRS
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed
/abusive-trust-tax-evasion-schemes-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc
/FJ6C-H5JC].
169 See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
170 The making of a completed gift does not necessarily result in gift tax liability given the gift tax exemption, under which no gift tax is payable until
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non-grantor trust and thereby avoid paying state tax on income
the assets generated while held in the trust.
2.New York Expands Grantor Trust Concept
In 2014, New York, a state which imposes an income tax,
sought to close down this technique.171 It amended its tax statute to provide that, if a taxpayer used this technique, the trust
would be treated as a grantor trust for state tax purposes even
though it would be treated as a non-grantor trust for federal
purposes.172 More specifically, under the amendment, where a
grantor makes a contribution to a trust that is not a completed gift
for federal gift tax purposes,173 the trust is treated as a grantor
trust for New York income tax purposes—requiring the grantor
to report all of the trust’s income on her state tax return.174
In broad terms, a trust is treated as a grantor trust for
federal tax purposes where the grantor has certain powers over,
or interests in, the trust.175 The premise is that, in such a case,
the grantor has not fully relinquished control over the trust assets and should therefore be treated for income tax purposes as
if the trust did not exist. And, as indicated, states that impose
an income tax typically follow the federal grantor trust rules,176
treating the income of a grantor trust as taxable to the grantor
for state tax purposes.
The New York amendment severed the connection between
the federal and state rules, treating all so-called incomplete gift
trusts (trusts structured so that transfers to it are not a completed
gift) as grantor trusts for state purposes.177 Under the amendment,

the taxpayer makes aggregate gifts during her life in excess $11,400,000 (under current law). I.R.C. § 2505 (2012). But even though no gift tax is due on
account of the exemption, whether or not a completed gift has occurred is
nonetheless consequential: all completed gifts are in effect included in the
donor’s estate tax calculation at the time of death. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (2012).
171 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2019).
172 Id.
173 For the rules that enable a person making a contribution to a trust to
render the gift incomplete for gift tax purposes, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2511-2
(as amended in 1999).
174 N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2019).
175 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 673–76, 678.
176 See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1964.
177 Id.
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if a New York taxpayer creates an incomplete gift trust, all of the
trust’s income must be reported on the taxpayer’s state return
even if the trust is a non-grantor trust for federal purposes.178
The New York model, if expanded, could possibly go a long
way toward solving the out-of-state trust problem. To illustrate,
assume New York (or any state that imposes an income tax)
amended its tax statute to provide that a trust created by a resident
where the grantor retains control, de facto or otherwise, is to be
treated as a grantor trust for state tax purposes regardless of
the trust’s status as a non-grantor trust for federal purpose. All
of the trust’s income would then be reportable on the grantor’s
New York return, even though the income would be reportable for
federal purposes on the trust’s return, and the out-of-state trust
would no longer provide an escape from New York income tax.179
Would such an expanded grantor trust concept violate due
process? Note first the difference between this concept and North
Carolina’s position in Kaestner. Whereas North Carolina sought to
tax the trust on its undistributed income based on the beneficiary’s
contact with the state (residence), the grantor-trust approach
would enable the state where the grantor resides to tax the grantor
on the trust’s income. While rejecting North Carolina’s position, the
Court explains and tacitly reaffirms two precedents upholding an
estate tax in the grantor’s estate on assets in an out-of-state trust.180
The Court’s discussion of these precedents suggests that
the due process analysis in the case of a tax imposed on a grantor

Id. Parenthetically, as a result of 2017 federal tax legislation, Tax Cuts
& Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2091 (2017), under which the gift tax
exemption has been substantially increased; I.R.C. § 2505; 26 C.F.R. § 601.602
(federal gift tax exemption of $11,400,000 in 2019), the New York amendment
has lost much of its force. New York taxpayers are now able to make completed
gifts to their out-of-state trusts without as much concern about gift tax liability because of the increased gift tax exemption.
179 Under the grantor-trust approach, if the grantor were to move to another state without an income tax after having contributed investment assets
to the trust, the trust’s income would no longer be subject to state taxation. But
this makes sense in that, had the trust not been created, the investment-asset
income would have ceased to be taxable at the state level once the move was
accomplished. The grantor-trust approach, in other words, works to close down
the out-of-state trust strategy but does not place taxpayers in a worse position
than if no trust had been created. See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1964.
180 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139
S. Ct. 2213, 2225 (2019).
178
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by the state where the grantor resides distills down to this question: whether the grantor has sufficient control over, or interest in,
the trust to justify the tax.181 While the Court framed the issue
analogously in assessing the validity of the tax imposed on the
Kaestner trust—whether the beneficiary residing in North Carolina
had sufficient control over, or interest, in the trust—it explicitly
left open the question whether a lower level of control would suffice where a state seeks to justify a tax on the grantor.182
3.Grantor Control: How Much Is Necessary to Satisfy Due
Process?
In the first precedent, Curry v. McCanless,183 the grantor had
created an out-of-state trust and had retained complete control over
the trust assets exercisable at his death (i.e., he had retained a
general power of appointment) as well as the right to receive
trust income during his life. The domicile state taxed the trust
assets, treating the grantor as if he had owned the trust’s assets.
Kaestner explains that the decedent’s control was sufficiently
extensive to justify the tax.184 In the second precedent, Graves v.
Elliot,185 the grantor again created an out-of-state trust and
again retained control, but in this case the control was in the form
of a revocation power.186 Kaestner explains that, as in Curry, the
grantor’s control was sufficient to validate the domicile state’s
estate tax on the trust’s assets.187 It then observes that “the Court


181 Professor Schoenblum argues that the New York’s grantor-trust concept
is unconstitutional, emphasizing that the New York statute deviates from the definition of a grantor trust under federal law and from the definition under the
law of every state that maintains a grantor-trust concept. Schoenblum, supra
note 23, at 1993–94. He does, however, intimate that, where a grantor retains
sufficient control over trust assets such that the trust should be ignored, it
would be constitutionally permissible for the state to tax the grantor on the
trust’s income. Id. at 1990.
182 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222 n.7.
183 307 U.S. 357, 360 (1939).
184 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222; see also Curry, 307 U.S. at 370 (“decedent’s
power to dispose of the intangibles was a potential source of wealth which
was property in her hands”).
185 307 U.S. 383, 384ï85 (1939).
186 See also Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 626 (1916) (grantor’s revocation power over trust permitted Wisconsin, where grantor resided, to impose
an inheritance tax on out-of-state trust).
187 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222.
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did not have occasion in Curry or Graves to explore whether a
lesser degree of control by a settlor also could sustain a tax by
the settlor’s domicile ....”188 And, as indicated, the Court adds that
“we do not today address that possibility ....”189
Which raises the question: what is the necessary level of
grantor control before a state can employ the grantor-trust concept
to tax the grantor on the trust’s income? For federal tax purposes,
there is an implicit assumption underpinning the grantor-trust
concept, as well as certain key estate tax provisions, in terms of
grantor control: that the grantor’s choice of trustee, in combination
with the terms of the trust, can give the grantor sufficient control
to justify treating the grantor as if she owned the trust assets.190

Id. at 2222 n.7.
Id. The Court also indicates that its “decision does not address state
laws that consider the in-state residency of a beneficiary as one of a combination of factors, that turn on the residency of a settlor, or that rely only on the
residency of noncontingent beneficiaries ....” Id. at 2225 (emphasis added).
190 For example, I.R.C. section 674(a) establishes a general rule under
which the grantor is treated as owning the trust’s assets where the trustee is
given discretion regarding distributions. And while there are several important
exceptions—applicable in general where the trust instrument constrains the
trustee’s discretion, where the discretion can only be exercised with the consent of a party with an adverse interest, or where the trustee is independent,
as defined in section 674(c)—none undermines the underlying idea that a
grantor who gives a friendly or non-adverse trustee sufficient discretion can
be treated as having retained enough control to warrant the attribution of the
trust’s income to the grantor. Two other income-tax sections expand on this
theme. Under section 679(a)(1), the grantor is treated as the owner of assets
in a foreign trust, with no exceptions, where the trust designates a U.S. beneficiary. And under section 677(a)(1)–(a)(3), attribution of ownership/income is
required where the trustee is given discretion to make distributions to the
grantor or her spouse. In the estate tax context, sections 2036(a)(2) and
2038(a)(2) treat the grantor as owning trust assets where the grantor can exercise control by herself or “in conjunction with any person.” In United States
v. O’Malley, the grantor named himself and two others as trustees. 383 U.S.
627, 629, 634 (1966). Because his two co-trustees could outvote him, the grantor’s control was limited. Yet the Court held, based on the “in conjunction
with” language in the predecessor section to section 2036(a)(2), that the
trust’s assets should be included in the grantor’s estate, reflecting the assumption underlying this language that the grantor’s selection of a trustee
can enable the grantor to enjoy continuing control. And while the outcome in
O’Malley would have been different had the grantor not been a trustee based
on the statutory language, the premise remains that attribution to the grantor based on an assumption of continuing control can be appropriate where
the grantor gives discretion to her chosen trustee.
188
189
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Although the Code is not explicit about this rationale,
these income and estate tax provisions presumably reflect the
psychological reality that a trustee chosen by the grantor will
feel some sense of obligation to accommodate, and perhaps defer to,
the wishes of the grantor in administering the trust and addressing
the needs of the grantor’s children and other family members. It
is surely not likely that a grantor would choose a trustee she perceived to be potentially indifferent to her concerns; nor is it likely
that the trustee would feel comfortable in frustrating those concerns. There is, in other words, a social contract between the
grantor and trustee.
To be sure, the grantor’s control over the trustee is not
capable of legal enforcement. Indeed, abdicating to the wishes of
the grantor could constitute a breach of the trustee’s duty to the
beneficiaries.191 But, as a practical matter, there is typically significant space for the trustee to exercise discretion with an eye
towards the grantor’s wishes without falling into a breach of duty.
A grantor who creates a trust for the benefit of family giving the trustee a measure of discretion has not, in substance,
fully relinquished control. Indeed, at the federal level, as suggested, income and estate tax provisions reflect this reality. And
if Congress were to broaden the grantor trust rules to include all
discretionary trusts for the benefit of the grantor’s family, with
the states adopting a parallel approach, it is difficult to conceive
of a viable constitutional challenge. Likewise, there is no justification for imposing a constitutional constraint on the states that
would prevent them from broadening the grantor-trust concept
without federal legislation.192 No extant precedent stands in the
way—and, most critically, the only defense offered in support of the
strategy is that the Constitution requires that it be permitted.193


See Estate of Wall v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 300, 312 (1993) (“trustee would
violate its fiduciary duty if it acquiesced in the wishes of the settlor”).
192 Although Professor Schoenblum argues that New York’s grantor-trust
approach is unconstitutional, he does imply that he would reach a different
conclusion if the scope of grantor-trust status were enlarged for federal purposes and New York simply followed the federal template. See Schoenblum,
supra note 23, at 1993–94, 1997–98. He does not explain why a change in the
federal statutory treatment of a trust should have an impact on the constitutional scope of the states’ taxing power.
193 For an early article exploring the modest use of the grantor-trust concept in the context of the out-of-state trust problem, see Roger John Traynor,
State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOWA L. REV. 268, 284–85 (1937); see also
191
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In short, until the grantor unequivocally surrenders control over investment assets via an outright gift, the state in which
the grantor resides ought to be able to continue taxing her on the
income those assets generate while held in trust—wherever the
trust is located.194
4.Grantor Trust on Kaestner Facts
Even on Kaestner-type facts, the grantor-trust concept could
be helpful. Although the Kaestner beneficiary had not contributed
assets to the trust or otherwise acted nominally as the grantor,
North Carolina might have argued that, in substance, the resident beneficiary was the grantor based on her consent to extend
the term of the trust (through its decanting). That is, where a beneficiary has a right to receive trust assets at the time of the trust’s
termination under the instrument but agrees to extend the term, it
could be argued that the beneficiary in substance received the assets and then reconveyed them to a new trust. Although North
Carolina did make reference to the fact that the beneficiary had
consented to extending the trust’s term in its brief, it did not connect this fact to a grantor-trust concept—understandably given the
lack of such a concept in its statutes.195


Joseph W. Blackburn, Constitutional Limits on State Taxation of a Nonresident
Trustee: Gavin Misinterprets and Misapplies Both Quill and McCulloch, 76
MISS. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2006) (citing Roger John Traynor, State Taxation of Trust
Income, 22 IOWA L. REV. at 268).
194 There would surely be no constitutional impediment if a state were to
attribute to a resident grantor the income of an in-state trust based on a theory of continuing control. Why should the constitutional analysis shift merely
because an out-of-state trust is used instead?
195 The concurring opinion maintains that, even absent the decanting,
North Carolina would have been precluded from taxing the trust until the
beneficiary reached age 40. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2227–28 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). It
points out that, in Safe Deposit, the Court similarly precluded Virginia from
taxing the trust while the beneficiary residing there was under the age (25)
designated in the trust instrument for termination and distribution. Id. And
it goes on to indicate that no aspect of Safe Deposit should be open for reconsideration. Id. Contrast this with the majority’s discussion of Safe Deposit as
a binding precedent: “The aspects of the case noted here are consistent with
the pragmatic approach reflected” in cases decided after Safe Deposit. Id. at
2221 n.6.
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Thus, the grantor-trust concept could possibly be implemented not only by the state where the nominal grantor resides
but also by the state where the beneficiary resides if the facts suggest that the beneficiary has acted, in substance, as a grantor.
5.Grantor-Trust Concept: Its Limitations
The grantor-trust concept has some inherent limitations.
First, by its very nature, it ceases to be effective once the grantor has died. As a practical matter, the trust’s post-death income
must either be taxed to the trust or to the beneficiaries—no longer
to the now-dead grantor. The federal grantor trust concept operates analogously, with post-death trust income taxed to the trust
or the beneficiaries. Thus, if a grantor who resides in a state that
imposes an income tax creates an inter vivos out-of-state trust, the
grantor-trust concept will only be effective during the grantor’s
life. After the grantor’s death, assuming that the trust continues to
be located in a tax-free state, the out-of-state trust issue re-emerges.
Second, the concept is similarly limited in the case of a
testamentary trust since the trust first becomes operative at the
time of death, at which point it is again no longer possible to tax
the grantor on post-death trust income. Here, again, the out-of-state
trust issue can re-emerge after the grantor’s death. Third, if the
grantor moves to a state without an income tax after having created
the trust, attributing the trust’s post-move income to the grantor
would not permit the grantor’s state of residence at inception to
reach the trust’s income.
Do these limitations argue against the grantor-trust concept as a solution? Not at all. Once the grantor has died or moved,
the policy argument in favor of permitting her state of residence
at inception to continue taxing the trust’s income weakens. The
equity and efficiency objections to the out-of-state trust, in other
words, dissipate considerably—if not disappear—once the grantor is no longer subject to tax by reason of death or a move to another state. For those who find this unsatisfactory, the founder’s
principle might be an attractive supplement. It would permit the
grantor’s state of residence at inception to continue taxing the
trust income indefinitely. But, as indicated, the constitutional
validity of the principle is in question.
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D.Throwback
While Kaestner does not permit the beneficiary’s state of
residence to tax the out-of-state trust on its undistributed income
and Brooke does not permit the state to tax the beneficiary on
such income, there is no policy justification for permitting the
beneficiary to escape taxation in her state of residence when the
income is distributed to her in a later year. After all, the benefits the
government makes available to a beneficiary and the corresponding
obligation of residents to contribute to the cost of government do
not depend on whether the income is immediately distributed or
instead accumulated and distributed in a later year.196
But if a state like North Carolina is to tax the beneficiary
at the point of such later distribution, a statutory mechanism is
needed, namely, a throwback rule. In fact, the Kaestner Court suggested that states seeking to combat the out-of-state trust strategy could adopt a throwback rule.197 Indeed, North Carolina’s
failure to enact the rule presumably cut against its argument that
the Court’s precedents have created a tax shelter that the states are
powerless to attack. The Justices apparently thought: why did
the state fail to take advantage of a readily available remedy?
At the federal level, a throwback concept has been utilized
to undercut the tax advantage that an accumulation of income
inside the trust provides. In essence, the idea is to tax the beneficiary when distribution is eventually made in a manner that
forces her to disgorge the benefits that the accumulation created.198
An interest charge is imposed to offset the advantages that stem
from deferring the tax liability until the point of distribution.199
When New York, in 2014, adopted its grantor-trust concept, it simultaneously adopted a throwback rule200 patterned
after the federal rule.201 Under this rule, New York imposes a tax


See Curry v. McCanless 307 U.S. 357, 370 (1938) (suggesting “taxation
is but a means of distributing the cost of government among those who are
subject to its control and who enjoy the protection of its laws”).
197 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2225 n.13.
198 Under current law, the throwback principle generally only applies in the
case of a foreign trust. I.R.C. § 665(c) (1997).
199 I.R.C. § 668 (1996).
200 N.Y. TAX LAW, § 612(b)(40) (McKinney 2019).
201 As the Kaestner Court indicates, California also utilizes the throwback
principle. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17745(b) (West 2019); Kaestner, 139 S. Ct.
at 2225 n.13.
196
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on a beneficiary residing in New York on a distribution of accumulated income as if, in rough terms, the beneficiary had received it
when it was earned. States that enact the rule will need to consider whether to follow the interest-charge approach under the
federal rule.
In essence, states seeking to attack the out-of-state trust
strategy have three available effective weapons: the founder’s principle, the grantor-trust concept, and the throwback rule. While
the founder’s principle (though constitutionally questionable) targets the trust, and the grantor-trust concept imposes the tax on
the grantor, the throwback rule attacks the strategy from the
beneficiary’s side of the transaction.
If these weapons are adopted in tandem, some accommodation would be necessary to prevent double taxation. For example, if the state of the grantor’s residence were to apply the
grantor-trust concept and therefore required the grantor to report
trust income on her return, subjecting the beneficiary to a throwback rule in her state of residence could produce double taxation: a
tax in the grantor’s state and a second tax in the beneficiary’s
state at the time of distribution. To the extent the states failed
to prevent such an outcome, courts could possibly intervene under the Dormant Commerce Clause cases.202
To be sure, the throwback rule is not a panacea. As North
Carolina argued, a beneficiary could move to a tax-free state before
receiving a distribution and then move back in a post-distribution
year.203 And while the rule could possibly be designed to prevent
this kind of avoidance,204 supplementing it with the grantor-trust

See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1994. But see Comptroller of Treasury
of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802–04 (2015) (not every case of double
taxation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause).
203 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2225–26.
204 Perhaps, a state could provide that, in the case of such a move, income
accumulated while the beneficiary resided in the state would remain subject
to its throwback rule even if the distribution were made after the taxpayer
moved to another state on the theory that the beneficiary’s right had accrued
while she was a resident. While taxpayers would likely challenge the constitutionality of this approach, an accrual concept has been applied in analogous
circumstances. For example, in In re Schibuk, the court held that payments
the taxpayer received from a partnership in a post-move year had accrued
while the taxpayer was still a New York resident and were therefore taxable
in New York. 733 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). On the other
hand, whether a beneficiary can be treated as having an accrued right before
202
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concept (or, to the extent constitutionally permissible, the
founder’s principle) would certainly fortify the states’ response
to the strategy.205
IV.ELIMINATING DUE PROCESS AS A CONSTRAINT:
EMPOWERING CONGRESS
An amicus brief in Kaestner suggested that the due process constraint on the authority of states to tax out-of-state
trusts (or other taxpayers) be eliminated.206 Were this to occur, a
state seeking to tax taxpayers or transactions having connections outside of its borders would still be subject to judicial control under the Dormant Commerce Clause and ultimately to
Congress’s control. There is much to be said for this approach.
The federalism issues implicated in the tax context would be
more easily amenable to solution through legislative regulation
(with litigation under the commerce clause as a back-up).207 And,

the trustee unequivocally determines to exercise discretion in favor of the
beneficiary is a debatable question.
205 In the personal jurisdiction context, some states have enacted legislation
that is designed to be coterminous with the Due Process Clause: permitting
the courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent that it is constitutionally
authorized. See, e.g., Cowan v. First Ins. Co., 608 P.2d 394, 398–99 (Haw. 1980)
(reach of long-arm statute to be determined by due process). Whether a tax
statute could be drafted similarly—taxing all out-of-state trusts to the extent
constitutionally permitted—is an interesting question. While such a statute
would not appear to run afoul of the Due Process Clause—just as its analogue
in the personal jurisdiction context is permitted—it would be problematic as
a policy matter given the inevitable administrative difficulty. Neither taxpayers nor the state would be clear about the taxability of a trust until the courts
ruled on the issue. On the other hand, the continuous need to litigate the question, together with the resulting uncertainty, might well deter taxpayers from utilizing the strategy.
206 Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 8, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner Family
Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (No. 18-457), 2019 WL 1112679, *8.
207 In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 298 (1992), the Court
empowered Congress by removing the due process impediment to the tax at
issue. In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2084–86 (2018), freed
from the constraint of due process by its decision in Quill and faced with
Congressional inaction, the Court altered its Commerce Clause analysis in
order to close down what it termed a “judicially created tax shelter.” Note also
that, in Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, Justice Scalia argued
in dissent that the Dormant Commerce Clause cases should be overruled. 135 S.
Ct. 1787, 1807–11 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This would leave Congress with
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indeed, the two key cases limiting the taxation of out-of-state trusts,
Safe Deposit and Brooke, are based on substantive due process principles, stemming from the now-discredited Lochner208 Era (one
decided in 1928, the other in 1929).209
In short, the inequity and inefficiency inherent in out-ofstate trusts could be effectively addressed by Congress—and, if
necessary, the courts—were the due process constraint eliminated.
But, unfortunately, Kaestner moves in the opposite direction, reaffirming and solidifying the constraint. Indeed, not a single Justice


the exclusive authority to regulate state taxing power under the Commerce
Clause. See also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Justice Scalia and raising question about Dormant Commerce Clause cases).
208 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905). To the extent Kaestner
provides support for the out-of-state trust strategy and for the wealthy who
employ it, it could be argued that it fits well within the spirit of Lochner. See,
e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1987) (“Lochnerian decisions flowed partly from the willful defense of wealth and power”).
But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process,
40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 386–90 (1988) (acknowledging this view of substantive
due process but arguing otherwise).
209 In rejecting the Virginia tax on due process grounds, the Court in Safe Deposit indicated that a different conclusion would “result in inescapable and
patent injustice whether through double taxation, or otherwise.” 280 U.S. 83, 92
(1929). Such a focus on “injustice” reflects a substantive due process approach.
See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(explaining his disagreement with the majority in Safe Deposit, Justice Holmes
indicates, “I cannot believe that the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended
to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions.”); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (a
primary feature of substantive due process is the protection it provides to liberty and rights the deprivation of which would result in a denial of justice). But,
as the Court has indicated, its substantive due process precedents are based
on a “restrained methodology”—a methodology that does not comfortably accommodate Safe Deposit. Id. On the other hand, note that International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), a seminal precedent from which
modern tax and jurisdictional cases emanate, itself appeared to accept a substantive due process strand in its focus on “fair play” in the context of determining
the presence of minimum contacts. See Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and
Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on International Shoe and its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 976–77 (1995)
(“fair play ... was attached in International Shoe to a new substantive due
process test of minimum contacts”). In any event, neither the majority nor
concurring opinion in Kaestner reveals a concern that Safe Deposit (or Brooke) is
inconsistent with—or even in tension with—Glucksberg.
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suggested that Safe Deposit or Brooke should be overruled—reflecting perhaps, as suggested, the looming battle over stare decisis.
CONCLUSION
No one defends the out-of-state trust strategy on policy
grounds. Instead, those who defend it maintain that the Due
Process Clause requires the states to permit it. Kaestner was the
vehicle, many had hoped, that would eliminate constitutional
constraints preventing the states from attacking the strategy. It
failed. What now?
Perhaps the states need to find a more compelling vehicle.
But given the key precedents that could be read to support the
strategy and given the current state of affairs in the Supreme
Court on stare decisis, finding the right vehicle may not be easy.
Indeed, Fielding was surely a better vehicle than Kaestner, and
yet the Court denied Minnesota’s certiorari petition one week
after deciding Kaestner.210 Finding the right vehicle, at least in
this judicial environment, will therefore be challenging.
Legislation is likely to be the more effective option. More
specifically, if an expansive grantor-trust concept were adopted,
one that is not tethered to its scope at the federal level, the trust’s
income would be reportable on the grantor’s state return without
regard to the trust’s status for federal purposes.211 While Kaestner
concluded that the presence of an in-state beneficiary was an insufficient contact to justify a tax on the undistributed income of
an out-of-state trust, one can discern in the majority opinion a
path left open for the states to tax the grantor, rather than the
trust, on its income.
To be sure, the majority did observe that, in prior cases
where such a tax was upheld, the grantor had control over the
trust assets.212 But it also indicated that the required level of
control in the context of a tax imposed on the grantor is an open
question and that it may be appropriate to permit the states
more leeway when they seek to tax an in-state grantor.213
Where a grantor creates a discretionary trust for the benefit of her family, she will typically enjoy de facto control over

See supra Section II.B.3.
See supra Section III.C.1.
212 See supra Section II.B.4.
213 Id.
210
211
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the trustee as a psychological matter.214 This insight animates
various federal provisions that tax the grantor on trust assets.
Analogously permitting the states to tax an in-state grantor on
trust income until control is fully surrendered—either by outright gift or by a gift to a nondiscretionary trust—would enable
them to eliminate in large part the out-of-state trust strategy.
No precedent stands in the way.215 The battle over stare decisis
lurking in the background of Kaestner should therefore not be an
obstacle. The majority sent another signal—this one more explicit—
to the states: that they are free to use a throwback rule to address
the problem.216 Supplementing the grantor-trust concept with a
throwback rule would certainly be salutary.
Finally, a few words about what might be considered the
ultimate question: should due process remain as a constraint in
the tax context? Although the question is an academic one given
Kaestner, it is nonetheless an important one. Had the Court
overruled the taxpayer-friendly precedents and rejected due process as a constraint in this context, it would have empowered
Congress to address the problem. And to the extent Congress
failed to do so, the states would have been free to find their own
solution—subject to the courts’ control under the Dormant Commerce Clause. But the Kaestner Court chose a different path, fortifying the precedents and thereby constraining the states. And if
the states are unable to find a solution, an abusive strategy disproportionately enjoyed by the wealthy will remain enshrined in
the Due Process Clause.
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